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Abstract
Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (DIQKD) is a formalism that supersedes
traditional quantum key distribution, as its security does not rely on any detailed modelling
of the internal working of the devices. This strong form of security is possible only using
devices producing correlations that violate a Bell inequality. Full security proofs of DIQKD
have been recently reported, but they tolerate zero or small amounts of noise and are re-
stricted to protocols based on specific Bell inequalities. Here, we provide a security proof of
DIQKD that is both more efficient and noise resistant, and also more general as it applies to
protocols based on arbitrary Bell inequalities and can be adapted to cover supra-quantum
eavesdroppers limited by the no-signalling principle only. It requires, however, the extra
assumption that the adversary does not have a long-term quantum memory, a condition
that is not a limitation at present since the best existing quantum memories have very short
coherence times.
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution is the art of distilling a secret key between two distant parties, Alice
and Bob, who have access to an untrusted quantum channel [1]. In this scenario, one typically
assumes that the equipment in Alice and Bob’s labs can be trusted, and moreover, that its
behavior is accurately described by a given theoretical model. Unfortunately, this often turns
out to be a very strong assumption which is not justified in practice [2]. In particular, many
loopholes can be exploited by an eavesdropper to get around the usual security proofs: for
instance, the state preparation might be imperfect [3], or the eavesdropper might perform a
blinding attack to take control of the detectors at a distance [4].
One way around such problems consists in exhaustively listing all the potential mismatches
between the theoretical model and the real implementation and taking care of each one of
them individually. However, this approach is dubious as it is impossible to be sure that all
loopholes have really been addressed. Another, more promising, approach is inspired by the
recent framework of device-independent quantum information processing [5, 6]. Here, the idea is
that if Alice and Bob are able to experimentally violate a Bell inequality [7], it means that their
data exhibit intrinsic randomness as well as secrecy [8, 9], independently of the internal operation
of the devices [5]. In the recent years, this framework has been used to prove the security
of device-independent key distribution [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18], to certify randomness
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expansion [20, 21, 22, 23, 24], self-testing of quantum computers [25] and states [26, 27], and
guarantee the presence of entanglement [28].
In the present work, we focus on the cryptographic task of key distribution, which has been
the subject of many very recent developments. Until recently, security proofs were restricted
to scenarios where Alice and Bob have access to a pair of memoryless devices or n indepen-
dent pairs of devices, thus ensuring that the measurements inside their own labs were causally
disconnected [11] or commuting [13, 14]. This is reminiscent of the notion of collective attacks
in standard QKD, where some independence assumption is required. Ideally, one would like a
protocol where only one device is required per party, and for which no assumption is needed
for the device. This is indeed the motivation for doing device-independent cryptography in the
first place.
Recent works have been able to get rid of this assumption. In Ref. [15], the authors intro-
duced a protocol based on the chained Bell inequality [29] and established its security against
arbitrary adversaries. The protocol, however, only produces a single secret bit and does not tol-
erate any noise. In Ref. [16, 17], the authors proved a strong converse of Tsirelson’s optimality
result for the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) game, based on the CHSH inequality [30]:
the only way using quantum resources to win the game as predicted by Tsirelson’s bound is to
use a strategy close to the optimal one for independent and identically distributed states, that
is, applying the optimal measurements on copies of a two-qubit maximally entangled state. This
theorem provides a security proof for DIQKD based on the CHSH inequality. Unfortunately, the
security proof does not resistant any constant amount of noise. While this work was completed,
Vazirani and Vidick gave a universally composable security proof of DIQKD against arbitrary
attacks [18]. Their protocol, based again on the CHSH inequality, is both reasonably efficient
(the key length scales linearly with the number of measurements) and tolerant to a constant
fraction of noise. A drawback, however, is that the maximum amount of noise tolerated is of the
order of 1%, significantly lower than the bounds obtained for protocols using n pairs of devices.
In the present paper, we present a security proof that (i) works for only two devices, that is,
does not require commuting measurements or memoryless devices, (ii) can be applied to generic
DIQKD protocols based on arbitrary Bell inequalities, (iii) has the same efficiency and tolerance
to noise than previous proofs using memoryless devices. All these nice properties, however,
come at the price of assuming that the adversary only holds classical information. While this
may seem a strong requirement, it can be easily enforced in any realistic implementation by
delaying the reconciliation process, since the best existing quantum memories have very short
coherence times [19]. Another advantage of our general framework is that it can also provide
security beyond quantum theory, that is, against eavesdroppers that are only limited by the
no-signalling principle.
The outline of the paper is the following. We first give a brief reminder of the relation
between non locality, that is, violation of a Bell inequality, and randomness. We then describe
the quantum key distribution protocol and present its secret key rate. We prove the security of
the protocol under the assumption that the eavesdropper does not have access to a long-term
quantum memory. We conclude by briefly comparing our results with the existing security
proofs, and discussing some rather natural follow-up questions.
2 Nonlocality and randomness
In the following, we consider a bipartite scenario where Alice and Bob input random variables X
and Y in their respective devices and obtain classical outputs A and B, respectively. We denote
λA, λB , λX , λY the sizes of the alphabets of A,B,X, Y , respectively. Moreover, we denote by
P (a, b|x, y) the probability of getting the specific results A = a,B = b when the inputs are
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X = x, Y = y, and P (A,B|X,Y ) the vector with components P (a, b|x, y).
A Bell inequality can be written as
I[P (A,B|X,Y )] :=
∑
a,b,x,y
β(a, b, x, y)P (a, b|x, y) ≤ Icl , (1)
where Icl is the classical upper-bound. To any such Bell inequality, one can associate a bound
on the randomness of the output A given the input X = x through a function τx such that
P (a|x) ≤ τx(I[P (A,B|X,Y )]) for all a ∈ λA . (2)
Such a function can be computed using the techniques given in [31], as explained in [21]. Without
loss of generality, this function can be assumed to be monotonically non-increasing and such
that − log(τx(·)) is convex.
For simplicity, we consider the case where there exist an input-independent bound, i.e. a
function τ such that τ(I) = τx(I) for all x ∈ λX . Examples of Bell inequalities satisfying
this property are: the CHSH inequality [30], the chained inequality [29], and the Collins-
Gisin-Linden-Massar-Popescu (CGLMP) inequality [32]. Our results, however, can easily be
generalised to cover the case of input-dependent bounds.
3 Description of the protocol
The DIQKD protocol that we consider in this paper is very general in the sense that it is
compatible with arbitrary Bell inequalities, in particular with the various examples of Bell
inequalities mentioned above. Our protocol consists of four steps: measurements, estimation of
the Bell violation, error correction and privacy amplification. We note n the number of times
each device is used during the protocol.
1. Measurements. Alice and Bob respectively generate the random variables Uj, Vj ∈ {0, 1}
with distribution Pr{Uj = 1} = Pr{Vj = 1} = q = n−1/8 for j = 1, . . . n. If Uj = 0 then
Alice measures round j with input 0 obtaining outcome Aj . If Uj = 1 then Alice generates
Xj with uniform distribution P (xj) = 1/λX and measures round j with inputXj obtaining
outcome Aj . Bob does the analog with Vj , input Yj , and outcome Bj . In other words,
events where Uj = Vj = 0 are used to establish a raw key, while events where Uj = Vj = 1
are used to test the Bell inequality and guarantee that a secret key can indeed be extracted
from the raw key.
2. Estimation. Alice and Bob publish (uj , vj) for all j, and discard the data corresponding
to the rounds with uj 6= vj . The data corresponding to the m post-selected rounds
(uj , aj , bj , xj , yj) with vj = uj is relabeled with the index i = 1, . . . m keeping the time
order. The data corresponding to the rounds of the set E := {i |Ui = Vi = 1} is also
published and used to estimate the Bell-inequality violation. More specifically, Alice and
Bob can use the public data to compute the following quantity:
Iest :=
λXλY
|E|
∑
i∈E
β(ai, bi, xi, yi) , (3)
The data of the rounds not in E constitutes the raw key of Alice R = (Ai)i/∈E and Bob
S = (Bi)i/∈E .
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3. Error correction. Alice and Bob publish nC bits in order to correct Bob’s errors S → S′.
For sufficiently large nC , all errors are corrected S
′ = R with high probability. Note that
some of the published bits are used to estimate how many more bits need to be publish
for a successful error correction. For large n, publishing nC ≈ nH(A|B) bits is enough.
For more details about the functioning of error correction, we refer to [33].
4. Privacy amplification. Alice generates and publishes a two-universal [34] random func-
tion F which maps R to an nK-bit string K = F (R). The number nK depends on the
published information as
nK := max
{
0,
⌊
−m log2 τ
( |E|
m
(
n1/8 − 1
)2
Iest − n−1/8
)
− nC − 2|E| log2(λAλB)−
√
n
⌋}
,
(4)
where ⌊γ⌋ is the largest integer not bigger than γ. Alice and Bob then compute (F (R), F (S′)),
obtaining two copies of the secret key.
Note that if the adversary holds a quantum memory, but cannot keep it for an arbitrary
long time, the honest parties should implement the protocol in two steps: (i) they receive
the quantum systems from the source and perform the measurements, (ii) some time T later
they perform the rest of the protocol involving the public communication for the estimation,
error correction, and privacy amplification. We show security under the assumption that the
adversary cannot keep a quantum memory for a time T . According to current and near-future
technology, this assumption can be enforced by taking T of the order of a few minutes [19].
4 Security and efficiency
To prove security, we will not make any assumption on the behaviour of the devices of Alice and
Bob, except that they do not broadcast information about the inputs and outputs towards the
adversary (a condition without which there is no hope of ever establishing any secret). Modulo
this requirement, we can even assume for simplicity that the devices have been built by the
adversary. The eavesdropper could in particular hold quantum systems that are entangled with
the systems in the users’ devices. However, our proof of security only holds under the condition
that the eavesdropper cannot store this quantum information past the measurement step of the
protocol. After this step, she should thus perform a measurement M on his quantum system,
which would give him some classical information E about the behaviour of Alice’s and Bob’s
devices. But since until this point no public communication has been exchanged between Alice
and Bob, we can as well assume that the eavesdropper has performed his measurement before
the users received their devices from the source. The fact that our proof of security holds
independently of the behaviour of the devices, then implies that it holds independently of the
prior classical information E that Eve holds on the devices, and we can thus forget E in the
following.
At the end of the protocol, Alice holds the secret key K, and Eve holds the information
published in the estimation step W = [(U1, . . . Um), (Ai, Bi,Xi, Yi)i∈E ], in the error correction
step C = θ(R), and in the privacy amplification step F . Note that here we consider the worst
case, where all the messages published within the error-correction step are a function θ of Alice’s
raw key R. Let P (k, f, w, c) be the probability distribution for these random variables.
We say that K is an ideal secret key if it is uniformly distributed and uncorrelated with all
the rest:
P (k, f, w, c) = 2−nK(w)P (f,w, c) for all k, f, w, c. (5)
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Note that since E and Iest are functions of w, so is nK . It is unrealistic to expect that a protocol
can generate an ideal secret key. Instead, what we demand is that the distribution generated
by the above protocol is indistinguishable from an ideal secret key. It is known that the optimal
success probability when discriminating the two distributions is [33]
psucc =
1
2
+
1
4
∑
k,f,w,c
∣∣∣P (k, f, w, c) − 2nK(w)P (f,w, c)∣∣∣ . (6)
The main result of this work (see the Theorem below) is to shows that
psucc ≤ 1
2
+ γ e−β
2
0
n1/8 , (7)
where γ is a constant and β0 =
√
8λXλY maxa,b,x,y |β(a, b, x, y)|. For large n, the success
probability (7) tends to 1/2, which makes the optimal discriminating strategy not better than
a random guess.
Let us now discuss the efficiency of the protocol in the asymptotic limit where n tends to
infinity. For large n one expects,
m ≈ nPr{U = V } ≈ n− 2n7/8 ,
|E| ≈ nPr{U = V = 1} ≈ n3/4 ,
with high probability. This gives an asymptotic secret key rate of
lim
n→∞
nK
n
= log
1
τ(Iest)
−H(A|B) . (8)
This is the same rate as the one given in [13] for memoryless devices but with security against
full quantum adversaries.
In the case of the CHSH inequality, β(a, b, x, y, ) = (−1)a⊕b⊕x·y, we define τQM and τNS such
that p(a|x) ≤ τQM(I[P (A,B|X,Y )]) holds against an adversary limited by quantum theory and
p(a|x) ≤ τNS(I[P (A,B|X,Y )]) holds against an adversary limited by the no-signalling principle.
The specific values of these functions was derived in [21, 13]:
τQM(I) =
1
2
(
1 +
√
2− I
2
4
)
, (9)
τNS(I) =
1
4
− I
4
. (10)
In Fig. 1, we plot the asymptotic secret key rate as a function of the visibility of the state
ρν = ν|φ〉〈φ| + (1− ν)1/4 shared by Alice and Bob.
5 Proof
We now proceed with a detailed security proof for the protocol described above. Before we
present and prove our main result which is an explicit bound on psucc, we need three technical
lemmas.
Let us introduce a more compact notation
ti :=
{
ai if i /∈ E
(ai, bi) if i ∈ E , (11)
zi :=
{
ui if i /∈ E
(ui, xi, yi) if i ∈ E , (12)
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Figure 1: Asymptotic secret key rate k vs noise 1 − ν for the CHSH protocol and a state
ρν = ν|φ〉〈φ|+(1−ν)1/4, where |ψ〉 is maximally entangled. The upper curve corresponds to a
quantum adversary while the lower one considers an adversary only limited by the no-signalling
principle.
for i = 1, . . . m. Variables with super-index i represent the chain of variables associated to time
steps equal or earlier than i, that is ti = (t1, t2, . . . ti). Recall that the information made public
in the estimation step is w = [um, (ai, bi, xi, yi)i∈E ] and that the raw key is r = (ai)i/∈E . Let
g = (ai, bi)i∈E and note that tm = (r, g) and w = (zm, g).
Lemma 1. The no-signaling constraints imposed by the causal structure of the protocol imply
P (tm|zm) ≤ τm(I¯[tm, zm]) , (13)
for all (tm, zm), where
I¯[tm, zm] :=
1
m
m∑
i=1
I
[
P (Ai, Bi|Xi, Yi, ti−1, zi−1)
]
. (14)
Note that above, in P (Ai, Bi|Xi, Yi, ti−1, zi−1), the symbols Ai, Bi,Xi, Yi are upper-case while
ti−1, zi−1 are lower-case, meaning that P (Ai, Bi|Xi, Yi, ti−1, zi−1) is the vector with components
P (ai, bi|xi, yi, ti−1, zi−1) for all values of ai, bi, xi, yi but fixed ti−1, zi−1.
Proof. This proof is based on an argument introduced in [21]. A useful observation is that
bound (2) implies
P (a, b|x, y) ≤ τ(I[P (A,B|X,Y )]) for all a, b, x, y . (15)
The following chain of equalities and inequalities follows from: Bayes rule, no-signaling to the
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future, bounds (2) and (15), and the concavity of the function log(τ(·)).
P (tm|zm) = P (t1|zm)P (t2, t3, . . . |zm, t1)
= P (t1|z1)P (t2, t3, . . . |zm, t1)
=
m∏
i=1
P (ti|zi, ti−1)
≤
m∏
i=1
τ
(
I
[
P (Ai, Bi|Xi, Yi, zi−1, ti−1)
])
≤ τm(I¯[tm, zm]) (16)

Lemma 2. The numbers |E|, Iest, I¯ are functions of the random variable (Tm, Zm), and
satisfy
Pr
{
I¯ ≤ |E| Iest
mPr{U = 1|U = V } − n
−1/8
}
≤ exp
(
−mn−3/4β−20
)
, (17)
where β0 =
√
8λXλY maxa,b,x,y |β(a, b, x, y)|.
(Here a comment is in order. Actually, I¯ is not only a function of (Tm, Zm) but also depends
on the global probability distribution P (Tm, Zm). But we think of this distribution as given,
fixed and unknown. This dependence prevents the straight generalization of the results in this
paper to a quantum adversary.)
Proof. The function
η(t, z) :=
{
0 if u = 0
β(a,b,x,y)
P (x,y) Pr{U=1|U=V } if u = 1
,
satisfies
m∑
i=1
η[ti, zi] =
Iest[t
m, zm] |E|
Pr{U = 1|U = V } , (18)
and
E
[
η(Ti, Zi)|ti−1, zi−1
]
= I[P (Ai, Bi|Xi, Yi, ti−1, zi−1)] , (19)
for all i. Consider the sequence of functions of (tm, zm) defined by
αl(t
l, zl) =
l∑
i=1
η(ti, zi)− E[η(Ti, Zi)|ti−1, zi−1] , (20)
for l = 1, . . . m. The fact that
E[αl(T
l, Z l)|tl−1, zl−1] = αl−1(tl−1, zl−1) (21)
implies that the sequence of random variables αl(T
l, Z l) is a martingale [35] with respect to
the sequence (Tl, Zl). Also, using the fact that P (x, y) = (λXλY )
−1 and Pr{U = 1|U = V } =
q2/
[
q2 + (1− q)2] ≥ q2, the differences
|αl(tl, zl)− αl−1(tl−1, zl−1)| ≤ 2max
t,z
|η(t, z)| ≤ 2maxa,b,x,y |β(a, b, x, y)|
(λXλY )−1q2
=: ν (22)
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are bounded for all values of (tm, zm). Constraints (21) and (22) constitute the premises for
Azuma’s inequality [35]
Pr
{
αl(T
l, Z l) ≥ lµ
}
≤ exp
(−(lµ)2
2 l ν2
)
, (23)
for any µ > 0. Using (18), (19) and (21) we obtain
I¯[tm, zm] =
1
m
m∑
i=1
I
[
P (Ai, Bi|Xi, Yi, zi−1, ti−1)
]
=
1
m
(
m∑
i=1
η[ti, zi]− αm(tm, zm)
)
=
1
m
( |E| Iest
Pr{U = 1|U = V } − αm(t
m, zm)
)
,
and setting µ = q = n−1/8 gives (17). 
Lemma 3. There is a good event G with probability
P (G) ≥ 1− 3 exp
(
−mn−3/4β−20
)
− (λAλB)−|E| , (24)
such that
P (r|w,G) ≤ 2 (λAλB)2|E| τm
( |E| Iest(w)
mPr{U = 1|U = V } − n
−1/8
)
, (25)
for all w such that P (w|G) > 0.
Proof. This proof uses a trick introduced in [23]. The values of (tm, zm) in the set
G1 :=
{
(tm, zm)
∣∣∣ I¯ ≥ |E| Iest
mPr{U = 1|U = V } − n
−1/8
}
, (26)
are the good ones, since Alice and Bob correctly lower-bound I¯ (and hence nK) from the values
|E| and Iest determined in the estimation step. In the condition defining G1 above, every symbol
is a constant except for I¯ , |E|, Iest which are functions of (tm, zm). Note that I¯ also depends on
the global distribution P (tm, zm), which prevents the generalization of this results to the case
of quantum adversary. Fortunately, according to Lemma 2, the probability of G1 is large
P (notG1) < exp
(
−mn−3/4 β−20
)
. (27)
Note the abuse of notation P (G1) = Pr{(Tm, Zm) ∈ G1}. Define the set
G2 := {w | P (G1|w) ≥ 1/2} , (28)
and note that P (notG1|notG2) > 1/2. Using this and P (notG1) ≥ P (notG1|notG2)P (not G2)
we obtain P (notG2) < 2P (notG1).
Recall G = (Ai, Bi)i∈E and note that Tm = (R,G) and W = (Zm, G). Define the set
G3 :=
{
(g, zm)
∣∣∣ P (g|zm) ≥ (λAλB)−2|E|} , (29)
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and note that
P (notG3) =
∑
(g,zm)/∈G3
P (zm)P (g|zm)
<
∑
g,zm
P (zm) (λAλB)
−2|E|
= (λAλB)
−|E| , (30)
where we have used
∑
g 1 = (λAλB)
|E|. The good event mentioned in the statement of this
lemma is G =“G1 andG2 andG3”, and has probability P (G) ≥ 1 − P (notG1) − P (notG2) −
P (notG3), as in (24).
We assume (g, zm) ∈ G2 ∩ G3, since it is a premise of the lemma. If (r, g, zm) /∈ G1 then
P (r|g, zm,G1) = 0. Hence, the non-trivial case happens for (r, g, zm) ∈ G1, which we assume in
what follows. Using Bayes rule, the definition of G2 and G3, Lemma 1, and (26), we obtain
P (r|g, zm,G1) ≤ P (r|g, z
m)
P (G1|g, zm)
≤ P (r, g|z
m)
P (G1|g, zm)P (g|zm)
≤ 2 (λAλB)2|E| τm
(
I¯[r, g, zm]
)
≤ 2 (λAλB)2|E| τm
( |E| Iest(g, zm)
mPr{U = 1|U = V } − n
−1/8
)
, (31)
which shows the lemma. 
Theorem. The distance between the secret key generated by the protocol and an ideal key is∑
k,f,w,c
∣∣∣P (k, f, w, c) − 2−nK(w)P (f,w, c)∣∣∣ ≤ 2(1−n1/2)/2 + 6e−mn−3/4 β−20 + 2(λAλB)−|E| .
Proof. Using definitions (4) and (34), Lemma 3, and
∑
c 1 = 2
nC , we obtain:
Pguess(R|C;w,G) =
∑
c
max
r
P (r, c|w,G)
=
∑
c
max
r
θ(r)=c
P (r|w,G)
≤
∑
c
2 (λAλB)
2|E| τm
( |E| Iest(g)
mPr{U = 1|U = V } − n
−1/8
)
,
= 21−nK(g)−
√
n .
The symbol Pguess(R|C;w,G) denotes the knowledge of R with respect to C (see Appendix)
when the statistics is conditioned on the events W = w and G. Next, we use the identity
P (tm, zm) = P (G)P (tm, zm|G) + P (notG)P (tm, zm|notG) (32)
with the event G introduced in Lemma 3. Noticing that (K,F,W,C) is a function of (Tm, Zm, F ),
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using (32), the triangular inequality, and Lemma 4, we see that
∑
k,f,w,c
∣∣∣P (k, f, w, c) − 2−nK(w)P (f,w, c)∣∣∣
≤
∑
k,f,w,c
∣∣∣P (k, f, w, c|G) − 2−nK(w)P (f,w, c|G)∣∣∣ + 2P (not G)
≤
∑
k,f,w,c
P (w|G)
∣∣∣P (k, f, c|w,G) − 2−nK(w)P (f, c|w,G)∣∣∣ + 2P (not G)
≤
∑
w
P (w|G)
√
2nK(w)Pguess(R|H;w,G) + 2P (not G)
≤
∑
w
P (w|G) 2(1−n1/2)/2 + 2P (notG)
= 2(1−n
1/2)/2 + 6exp
(
−mn−3/4 β−20
)
+ 2(λAλB)
−|E| ,
which concludes the proof. 
6 Conclusions
In this work, we provide a novel security proof for DIQKD. Contrary to most of the existing
proofs, it applies to the situation in which Alice and Bob generate the raw key using two devices.
In particular, it does not need to assume that the devices are memoryless or, equivalently, that
each raw-key symbol is generated using a different device. While there exist other recent proofs
that also work without this assumption, they tolerate zero [15, 16, 17] or rather small amounts of
noise [18]. Another important feature of our proof is that it can also be applied to non-signalling
supra-quantum eavesdroppers. All these advantages come at the price of making an extra
assumption on Eve: she does not have access to a long-term quantum memory and, therefore,
effectively she cannot store quantum information. While this may at first be considered a strong
assumption (and is actually not needed in new security proofs for DIQKD [15, 16, 17, 18]), it
is a very realistic assumption taking into account current technology.
The natural open question is to understand how the assumption on the memory can be
removed within the framework presented here, or how the other proofs [15, 16, 17, 18] could be
improved to tolerate realistic noise rates. In the case of no-signalling eavesdroppers, there is some
evidence suggesting that the fact that Eve can store information and delay her measurement
prevents any form of privacy amplification between the honest parties [36]. However, the recent
results of [18] imply that privacy amplification is indeed possible against quantum eavesdroppers.
A good understanding of privacy amplification in the device-independent quantum scenario is
probably the missing ingredient to get robust and practical fully device-independent security
proofs.
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Appendix
A random function F : R→ {0, 1}n is two-universal [34] if
Pr{F (r) = F (r′)} ≤ 2−n ,
for all r, r′ ∈ R with r 6= r′. The following is a simple extension of the main result in [34].
Lemma 4. Let R,E be two (possibly correlated) random variables where R takes values in the
set R, and let F : R → {0, 1}n be a two-universal random function [34]. The random variable
K = F (R) satisfies
∑
k,f,e
∣∣P (k, f, e) − 2−nP (f, e)∣∣ ≤√2n Pguess(R|E) , (33)
where
Pguess(R|E) =
∑
e
max
r
P (r, e) . (34)
Proof. Using the convexity of the square function, the fact that F is independent of R,E and
two-universality we obtain:

∑
k,f,e
∣∣P (k, f, e) − 2−nP (f, e)∣∣


2
≤
∑
k,f,e
P (f, e) 2−n
(
2n
∑
r
P (r|e) δkf(r) − 1
)2
=
∑
f,e
P (f, e) 2−n

22n∑
r,r′
P (r|e)P (r′|e) δf(r′)f(r) + 2n − 21+n


= −1 + 2n
∑
f,e
P (f, e)

∑
r 6=r′
P (r|e)P (r′|e) δf(r′)f(r) +
∑
r
P (r|e)2


≤ 2n
∑
e
P (e)
∑
r
P (r|e)2
≤ 2n Pguess(R|E) .

References
[1] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M. Dusˇek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus and M. Peev,
The security of practical quantum key distribution, Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 1301 (2009).
[2] V. Scarani, and C. Kurtsiefer, The black paper of quantum cryptography: real implementa-
tion problems, arXiv:0906.4547.
[3] F. Xu,, B. Qi, H.-K. Lo, Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a prac-
tical quantum key distribution system, New J. Phys. 12 113026 (2010).
11
[4] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar and V. Makarov, Hacking com-
mercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination, Nature Photonics 4
686 (2010).
[5] A. Acin, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, S. Massar, S. Pironio and V. Scarani, Device-independent
security of quantum cryptography against collective attacks, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 230501
(2007).
[6] D. Mayers and A. Yao, Self testing quantum apparatus, Quant. Inform. Comput. 4 273
(2004).
[7] J. S. Bell, Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics, Cambridge University Press
(Cambridge, 1987).
[8] A. Ekert, Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67 661 (1991).
[9] J. Barrett, L. Hardy, and A. Kent, No signaling and quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 95 010503 (2005).
[10] S. Pironio, A. Acin, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, S. Massar and V. Scarani, Device-independent
quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks, New J. Phys. 11, 045021 (2009).
[11] L. Masanes, Universally composable privacy amplification from causality constraints, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 102 140501 (2009).
[12] L. Masanes, R. Renner, M. Christandl, A. Winter and J. Barrett, Unconditional security
of key distribution from causality constraints, arXiv:quant-ph/0606049.
[13] L. Masanes, S. Pironio and A. Ac´ın, Secure device-independent quantum key distribution
with causally independent measurement devices, Nature Comm. 2 238 (2011).
[14] E. Ha¨nggi and R. Renner, Device-independent quantum key distribution with commuting
measurements, arXiv:1009.1833.
[15] J. Barrett, R. Colbeck and A. Kent, Unconditionally secure device-independent quantum
key distribution with only two devices, arXiv:1209.0435.
[16] B. Reichardt, F. Unger and U. Vazirani, A classical leash for a quantum system: Command
of quantum systems via rigidity of CHSH games, arXiv:1209.0448.
[17] B. Reichardt, F. Unger and U. Vazirani, Classical command of quantum systems via rigidity
of CHSH games, arXiv:1209.0449.
[18] U. Vazirani and T. Vidick, Fully device independent quantum key distribution,
arXiv:1210.1810.
[19] The two main approaches for quantum memories are based on ensemble of atoms or on
crystals. To our knowledge, the best existing quantum memories with ensemble of atoms
have coherence times of the order of 100 milliseconds, A. G. Radnaev et al., Nature Phys.
6, 894 (2010). Moving to crystals, coherence times of the order of a few seconds have been
reported for classical light, see J. J. Longdell, E. Fraval, M. J. Sellars and N. B. Manson,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 063601 (2005). While in principle the method should be scalable to
light at the quantum level, this has not been demonstrated yet. Of course, improvements
on these coherence times may be expected in the foreseeable future, however there is no
evidence that these improvements will be significant.
12
[20] R. Colbeck, Quantum And Relativistic Protocols For Secure Multi-Party Computation, PhD
Thesis, University of Cambridge.
[21] S. Pironio, A. Ac´ın, S. Massar, A. Boyer de la Giroday, D. N. Matsukevich, P. Maunz, S.
Olmschenk, D. Hayes, L. Luo, T. A. Manning and C. Monroe, Random numbers certified
by Bell’s theorem Nature 464 1021 (2010).
[22] S. Pironio and S. Massar,Security of practical private randomness generation,
arXiv:1111.6056.
[23] S. Fehr, R. Gelles and C. Schaffner, Security and Composability of Randomness Expansion
from Bell Inequalities, arXiv:1111.6052.
[24] U. V. Vazirani and T. Vidick, Certifiable Quantum Dice-Or, testable exponential random-
ness expansion, arXiv:1111.6054.
[25] F. Magniez, D. Mayers, M. Mosca and H. Ollivier, Self-Testing of Quantum Circuits, Pro-
ceedings of 33rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming,
volume 4051, series Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 72 (2006).
[26] C.-E. Bardyn, T. C. H. Liew, S. Massar, M. McKague and V. Scarani, Device independent
state estimation based on Bell’s inequalities, Phys. Rev. A 80, 062327 (2009).
[27] M. McKague, T. H. Yang and V. Scarani, Robust self-testing of the singlet, arXiv:1203.2976.
[28] J.-D. Bancal, N. Gisin, Y. C. Liang and S. Pironio, Device-Independent Witnesses of Gen-
uine Multipartite Entanglement, Phys. Rev. Lett. 106 250404 (2011).
[29] S. L. Braunstein and C. M. Caves, Wringing out better Bell inequalities, Ann. Phys. 202
22 (1990).
[30] J. F. Clauser, M. A. Horne, A. Shimony and R. A. Holt, Proposed experiment to test local
hidden-variable theories, Phys. Rev. Lett. 23 880 (1969).
[31] M. Navascue´s, S. Pironio and A. Ac´ın, Bounding the set of quantum correlations Phys. Rev.
Lett. 98 010401 (2007); A convergent hierarchy of semidefinite programs characterizing the
set of quantum correlations, New J. Phys. 11, 045021 (2009).
[32] D. Collins, N. Gisin, N. Linden, S. Massar and S. Popescu, Bell inequalities for arbitrarily
high-dimensional systems, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88 040404 (2002).
[33] R. Renner, Security of Quantum Key Distribution, PhD Thesis, arXiv:quant-ph/0512258.
[34] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Crepeau and U. M. Maurer, Generalized privacy amplifi-
cation, IEEE Trans. Inf. Th. 41, 6, 1915 (1995).
[35] K. Azuma, Weighted sums of certain dependent random variables, Tohoku Mathematical
Journal 19, 357 (1967).
[36] R. Arnon-Friedman, E. Ha¨nggi and A. Ta-Shma, Towards the Impossibility of Non-
Signalling Privacy Amplification from Time-Like Ordering Constraints, arXiv:1205.3736;
R. Arnon-Friedman and A. Ta-Shma, On the limits of privacy amplification against non-
signalling memory attacks, arXiv:1211.1125.
13
